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Takka Takka Bom Bom - Al J. Venter - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

Standing Tall - Robert F. Foley - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

Omaha Beach - Leo Marriott - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Revolutionary War - David Smith - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

DKK 238.00
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Hood's Defeat near Fox's Gap - Curtis L. Older - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa, 1914-1917 - David Brock Katz - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa, 1914-1917 - David Brock Katz - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

World War I ushered in a renewed scramble for Africa. At its helm, Jan Smuts grabbed the opportunity to realise his ambition of a Greater South Africa. He set his sights upon the vast German colonies of South-West Africa and East Africa - the demise of which would end the Kaiser''s grandiose schemes for Mittelafrika. As part of his strategy to shift South Africa''s borders inexorably northward, Smuts even cast an eye toward Portuguese and Belgian African possessions. Smuts, his abilities as a general much denigrated by both his contemporary and then later modern historians, was no armchair soldier. This cabinet minister and statesman donned a uniform and led his men into battle. He learned his soldiery craft under General Koos De la Rey''s tutelage, and another soldier-statesman, General Louis Botha during the South African War 1899-1902. He emerged from that war, immersed in the Boer manoeuvre doctrine he devastatingly waged in the guerrilla phase of that conflict. His daring and epic invasion of the Cape at the head of his commando remains legendary. The first phase of the German South West African campaign and the Afrikaner Rebellion in 1914 placed his abilities as a sound strategic thinker and a bold operational planner on display. Champing at the bit, he finally had the opportunity to command the Southern Forces in the second phase of the German South West African campaign. Placed in command of the Allied forces in East Africa in 1916, he led a mixed bag of South Africans and Imperial troops against the legendary Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his Shutztruppe. Using his penchant for Boer manoeuvre warfare together with mounted infantry led and manned by Boer Republican veterans, he proceeded to free the vast German territory from Lettow-Vorbeck''s grip. Often leading from the front, his operational concepts were an enigma to the British under his command, remaining so to modern-day historians. Although unable to bring the elusive and wily Lettow-Vorbeck to a final decisive battle, Smuts conquered most of the territory by the end of his tenure in February 1917. General Jan Smuts and his Great War in Africa makes use of multiple archival sources and the official accounts of all the participants to provide a long-overdue reassessment of Smuts''s generalship and his role in furthering the strategic aims of South Africa and the British Empire in Africa during World War I.

DKK 288.00
1

In Strange Company - Roland J. Tiso - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

In Strange Company - Roland J. Tiso - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The decision to not deploy reoriented, trained Iraqi divisions and other allied forces in numbers significant enough to adequately stabilize the situation in Iraq in 2003–04 resulted in significant shortages of manpower and equipment that eventually led to a less-than-satisfactory ending to the campaign, and significantly challenged the entire Coalition effort in the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions assumed by allies were vitally important in the under-resourced effort to bring order to the chaos of Iraq but would remain relatively unheralded throughout most of the campaign.Colonel Tiso’s account of this time offers unique insights into the challenges of planning the Iraqi campaign and the intricacies and challenges of multinational service through the lens of his assignments as a war planner at U.S. Central Command, Senior Military Adviser of the Arab Peninsula Shield Force and the Polish-led Multinational Division (Central-South), and Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (C-3) of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team tasked to develop the New Iraqi Army. His observations cast significant light on the missions these units undertook and the challenges they confronted.His firsthand account of operational planning for war in Iraq captures the concerns of the military planners and senior commanders to liberate and stabilize the country, enabling the reader to better understand the challenges of operational war planning, coalition warfare, the difficulty of stabilizing Iraq after the fall of Baghdad, the development of the New Iraqi Army, and ultimately a deeper understanding of America’s “long war” in Iraq.

DKK 337.00
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The Defeat of the Damned - Douglas E. Nash Sr. - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Defeat of the Damned - Douglas E. Nash Sr. - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

One of the most notorious yet least understood body of troops that fought for the Third Reich during World War II was the infamous Sondereinheit Dirlewanger, or the “Dirlewanger Special Unit.” Formed initially as a company-sized formation in June 1940 from convicted poachers, it served under the command of SS-Obersturmführer Oskar Dirlewanger, one of the most infamous criminals in military history. First used to guard the Jewish ghetto in Lublin and support security operations carried out in occupied Poland by SS and Police forces, the unit was soon transferred to Belarus to combat the increasingly active Soviet partisan movement. After assisting in putting down the Warsaw Uprising during August–September 1944, by November of that year it had been enlarged and retitled as the 2\. SS-Sturmbrigade Dirlewanger. One month later, it fought one of its most controversial actions near the town of Ipolysag, Hungary, now known by its Slovak name of Šahy, between 13 and 18 December 1944\. As a result of its overly hasty and haphazard deployment, lack of heavy armament, and a confusing chain of command, it was virtually destroyed by two Soviet mechanized corps.Consequently, the Wehrmacht leadership blamed Dirlewanger and the performance of his troops for the encirclement of the Hungarian capital of Budapest during late December 1944 that led to the annihilation of its garrison two months later. The brigade’s defeat at Ipolysag also led to its compulsory removal from the front lines by General der Panzertruppe Hermann Balck and its eventual shipment to a rest area where it would be completely rebuilt, so thorough was its destruction. Despite its lackluster performance, the brigade was rebuilt once again and sent to East Prussia in February 1945, but never recovered from the thrashing it received at the hands of the 6th Guards Army in December.

DKK 289.00
1

Revolutionary War Forts - Michael Garlock - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

Alliances & Armor - Jim Pomeroy - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

Alliances & Armor - Jim Pomeroy - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The People’s Army of Vietnam’s decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC’s and Soviet Union’s actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi.As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War.As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN’s use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach “détente” with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed “Easter Offensive” in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon.

DKK 219.00
1

Born From War - Patrick W. Naughton Jr. - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

Turning Points - Thomas J. Corcoran - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Vicksburg Campaign, 1863 - Chris Mackowski - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Vicksburg Campaign, 1863 - Chris Mackowski - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

By the end of March 1863, Major General Ulysses S. Grant was at a crossroads in his military career. His bold attempts in the late fall 1862 and winter of 1862/63 had all come up fall short of his objective: get his army on high ground north and east of Vicksburg and capture the last major obstacle on the Mississippi River.Grant had been stymied by the difficult region’s swampy bayous as well as Confederate resistance at key locations that thwarted his advances and prolonged his army’s miserable dispositions in the sickly camps of Louisiana bottomland. Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton had performed well using his interior rail lines and intelligence networks to place blocking forces or obstructions that delayed or derailed Grant’s movements.Realizing his career was on the line, Grant chose the riskiest operation he could have concocted. In a joint military operation, Grant marched two of his army corps down the roads and along the bayous of Louisiana, repairing them as they progressed, while Acting Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter led his ironclad gunboats with transports past the Confederate heavy artillery defending Vicksburg’s riverfront. It was Grant’s hope to get enough boats below the city to enable a crossing of the Mississippi River, a forced march into the state, and arriving at Vicksburg’s doorsteps from the east–west approach. In doing this, Grant would sever his main line of logistics and supply, something his subordinate officers thought was a disastrous mistake. Grant would take the risk in a zero-sum game: he would capture Vicksburg or destroy himself and his army doing so.Realizing his career was on the line, Grant chose the riskiest operation he could have concocted. In a joint military operation, Grant marched two of his army corps down the roads and along the bayous of Louisiana, repairing them as they progressed, while Acting Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter led his ironclad gunboats with transports past the Confederate heavy artillery defending Vicksburg’s riverfront. Grant hoped to get enough boats below the city to enable a crossing of the Mississippi River. Then, he would force a march into the state and arrive at Vicksburg’s back door from the east. In doing this, Grant would sever his main line of logistics and supply, something his subordinate officers thought was a disastrous mistake. Grant would take the risk in a zero-sum game: he would capture Vicksburg or destroy himself and his army doing so.

DKK 223.00
1

USMC Tank Markings in the Pacific - Romain Cansiere - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

Rome to the Po River - Heinz Greiner - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The U.S. Army, 1783–1811 - John R. Maass - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Campaign of 1812 - Steven J. Rauch - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Campaign of 1812 - Steven J. Rauch - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The War of 1812 was born out of longstanding tensions between the United States and Great Britain. Centered on maritime disputes, the war arose from British policies that disregarded U.S. sovereignty, including the impressment of American sailors into the Royal Navy and restrictions on American trade. These provocations, coupled with British support for Native American resistance on the western frontier, led President James Madison to advocate for military action. The book explores the United States' ambitious yet flawed strategy of 1812 to invade Canada as a means to counter British aggression. Despite initial optimism, the U.S. Army faced significant challenges, including insufficient manpower, untrained militias, logistical failures, and inadequate leadership. Disjointed campaigns in Detroit, Queenston Heights, and other key theaters highlighted systemic issues within the War Department and military operations. Meanwhile, British control of waterways and superior coordination allowed their smaller forces to outmaneuver and frustrate American efforts. This fully illustrated volume examines the realities of early 19th-century warfare, from the fragile logistics of supplying armies to the political tensions shaping military decisions. It offers assessment of the challenges faced by the young republic, and highlights how early setbacks laid the groundwork for eventual reform and resilience in the war’s later stages.

DKK 219.00
1

Money and Freedom - Andrew Selkirk - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

Flawed Commanders and Strategy in the Battles for Italy, 1943–45 - Pier Paolo Battistelli - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Mighty A: The Short, Heroic Life of the USS Atlanta (CL-51) - David F. Winkler - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The Mighty A: The Short, Heroic Life of the USS Atlanta (CL-51) - David F. Winkler - Bog - Casemate Publishers - Plusbog.dk

The attack on Pearl Harbor shocked the nation. With the declaration of war, lines formed outside of recruiting stations as Americans desired to don the uniform and go after the Japanese aggressors. With Margaret Mitchell serving as the ship’s sponsor, Atlanta’s Christmas Eve commissioning in December 1941, served as a rallying point for a country weary of bad news overseas. Some of those new recruits who signed on to fight the Axis after December 7, would find their way to Atlanta’s quarterdeck. For the capital of the Peachtree State, the ship was not only a source of civic pride, but a reason for many young men to join the Navy with the promise of assignment. The Mighty A will be the first book to tell their collective story.Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent loss of the British battleships Repulse and Prince of Wales off Malaysia, the U.S. Navy’s leadership discovered that the surface fleet was highly vulnerable to air attack, thanks to the introduction of drone aircraft that could simulate attacks on its warships. The Navy’s gunners simply did not have the coordinated firepower to knock them down. Hence the development of 1.1 inch, 20 mm, and 5 inch 38 caliber guns married with fire-control radar technology that could rapidly expend ordnance against incoming aircraft. The result of this vulnerability recognition is a new class of warship led by USS Atlanta. Unfortunately, not all of the Navy’s sea commanders will have a full appreciation of the light cruiser designed mission. Lieutenant Commander Mustin terms these tactically inept officers as “Jugheads.”This story reinforces the notion that American military officers during this era are unafraid of taking their own initiatives without the permission of superiors in combating the enemy. Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky typifies this breed of independent thinkers, who played a hunch to follow the wake of a speeding Japanese destroyer at the Battle of Midway with his bomber squadron that led him and his compatriots to the Japanese carriers.The narrative also covers a part of the war that even the U.S. Navy overlooks. In elevating the Battle of Midway anniversary to join the Navy’s Birthday as an official annual Navy commemoration in 1998, the Chief of Naval Operations Jay Johnson unintentionally slighted the importance of subsequent actions in the southwest Pacific. The Guadalcanal campaign has been a narrative long owned by the Marine Corps who complain they were abandoned by the Navy to forage for themselves against a determined Japanese foe. This storyline has served to build up the lore and enhance the reputation of the Corps. However, not to denigrate the Marines'' struggle ashore, the battle for Guadalcanal was predominantly naval. The Navy’s casualties during the six-month campaign were triple that of the Marine Corps.

DKK 289.00
1